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This matter is before the court upon appellee's motion to 
strike appellant's reply brief, filed June 17, 1996, and upon 
appellant's motion to enlarge time to respond to motion to 
strike, filed July 1, 1996. 
On July 8, 1996, appellant filed her memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to strike. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion to enlarge time 
to respond to motion to strike is granted, with the memorandum 
filed on July 8, 1996, deemed timely filed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ruling on appellee's motion to 
strike appellant's reply brief is deferred pending assignment of 
the appeal to a panel of this court for disposition. 
Dated this /fy day of July, 1996. 
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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant Bonnie Kay 
Harris (hereinafter, "Mrs. Harris") and the Defendant/Appellee Theresa 
Gutirrez Spivey (hereinafter, "Spivey"). 
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IV 
OBJECTIONS TO SPIVETS STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Harris objects to Spivey's erroneous standard of review for 
issues of facts on the appeal of her Motion to Dismiss. Motions to 
dismiss are reviewed under a correctness of error standard, both 
issues of fact and issues of law, without any deference to the trial 
court's ruling, not under a clearly erroneous standard as Spivey 
asserts in her Brief. Barnard v. Utah State Bar. 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 
1993), citing, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); 
Petersen v. Davis County School Dist., 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993). 
Mrs. Harris also objects to paragraph No. 9 of Spivey's Statement 
of Facts. Glendon G. Spivey (hereinafter, "Glendon") did not change 
the beneficiaries on his retirement and 401K plan as Spivey asserts. 
Spivey made the changes and had Glendon sign the form at a time when 
he could neither read nor write beyond signing his name. Spivey 
admitted in a deposition subsequent to the Order of Dismissal in this 
matter that she is the one who made the changes on Glendon's 
retirement and pension plans. 
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 10 of Spivey1s Statement of 
Facts. Wade Spivey is not a beneficiary of Glendon's retirement and 
pension benefits and never was a beneficiary. Only Spivey was a 
beneficiary of the benefits, which have since been distributed to her. 
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 11 of Spivey's Statement of 
Facts. Spivey and Wade are not dependent on Glendon's retirement and 
pension benefits for their health, welfare, education and living 
expenses. Wade receives approximately $900.00 per month social 
security benefits. Spivey also receives social security benefits, 
Spivey received all of Glendon's savings, checking accounts, life 
insurance benefits, credit union accounts and insurance. She lives in 
a $250,000.00 home with no mortgage. Her motor vehicles are owned 
free and clear of any loans, and she is presently employed. 
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 14 of Spivey's Statement of 
Facts. Glendon was not deceased on stipulation as Spivey asserts. 
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 15 of Spivey's Statement of 
Facts. Paragraph No. 15 is not a statement of fact. What Spivey 
believes or what appears to be something in her mind is not a 
statement of fact. It is merely her opinion, speculation, and 
conclusion. 
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VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. 
Harris1 Petition is barred by the doctrine of laches. The trial court 
also erred as a mater of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition 
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court further 
erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition is 
barred by the holding of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 
(Utah App. 1988). And, the trial court again erred as a matter of law 
in determining that the divorce decree between Mrs. Harris and Glendon 
cannot be modified after Glendon's death. 
VII 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN GRANTING SPIVEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT MRS. 
HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
Spivey has no legitimate response to Mrs. Harris1 assertion that 
the court erred in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by 
the doctrine of laches. Spivey cannot cite this Court to any case or 
other authority contradicting the cases and treatises cited by Mrs. 
Harris in her Appeal Brief. Therefore, Spivey, in a pathetic attempt 
to breath life into her hapless argument, and in direct contravention 
of Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, cites to 
the unpublished decision of Judge Schofield in this very case as 
precedential authority. Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration specifically states: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value and shall not be 
cited in the courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the 
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel 
If Spivey wishes to refer to Judge Schofield's decision in this 
case it should be as a cite to the record in Spivey's Statement of 
Facts, as a footnote in her Brief or as background for argument, but 
it should not be cited as authority in her argument in chief. It is 
the ultimate boot-strap effort to cite as authority the very decision 
of the trial court that is being appealed. Spivey's citation to Judge 
Schofield's decision is not only totally devoid of any precedential 
value, it is a direct violation of Utah law, and that portion of 
Spivey's brief should be stricken. 
Spivey's assertion that laches applies in this case because Mrs. 
Harris allegedly had all facts concerning Glendon's assets available 
to her during the divorce proceeding is not only legally incorrect, 
but it is also factually untrue. Mrs. Harris never knew that Glendon 
had any retirement benefits to be apportioned in their divorce. 
Glendon falsely represented in documents filed with the Court, and 
signed under oath, that he had no retirement benefits. Mrs. Harris 
only learned of Glendon's retirement benefits in 1995, as a result of 
her counsel's research in the probate case of Glendon's estate. 
Therefore, and contrary to Spivey's assertion, it was not factually or 
legally possible for Mrs. Harris to assert her rights to a martial 
asset, i.e., Glendon's retirement and pension benefits, before she 
knew of its existence. 
Spivey has failed to demonstrate that she has been prejudiced by 
Mrs. Harris' failure to assert her lawful right to her share of 
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits until this time. While 
Spivey is clearly entitled to that portion of Glendon's retirement 
benefits earned after her marriage to Glendon, she is not legally or 
morally entitled to that portion of Glendon's retirement and pension 
benefits earned prior to the time she married him. Unless Spivey is 
willing to admit that she only married Glendon for his money and 
benefits, she cannot even assert that she is or will be prejudiced by 
Mr. Harris receiving her lawful share of Glendon's benefits that she 
should have been awarded in her divorce settlement with Glendon. The 
spouse of a person that is in possession of stolen or otherwise 
misappropriated property does not acquire any rights in that property 
simply because the rightful owner of the property does not learn of 
the property's whereabouts until after the party unlawfully in 
possession of the property dies. 
A basic and fundamental principal of law, as previously stated in 
Mrs. Harris Appeal Brief, is that the mere passage of time does not 
constitute laches. 24 Am Jur 2d. Divorce and Separation, § 487 and § 
492. The Utah Supreme Court has continually and repeatedly held that 
the mere laps of time, where the parties remain in the same relative 
position, the delay working no serious wrong to the adverse party and 
justice being possible, will not operate as laches. Roberts v. 
Braffett, 92 P 789 (1907), citing Hamilton v. Doolev, 15 Utah 280, 29 
P 769 (1897). 
Because Spivey has not and cannot demonstrate to this Court that 
she has been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever by a delay on the 
part of Mrs. Harris in asserting her lawful right to a share of 
Glendon's pension and retirement benefits, the doctrine of laches does 
not apply in this case. Likewise, because Spivey cannot demonstrate 
that she changed her position because of Mrs. Harris1 delay in 
asserting her lawful right to a share of Glendon's pension and 
retirement benefits, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to this 
case. 
Because the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to the facts of 
this case, the trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a 
matter of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by 
the doctrine of laches. Therefore, the trial court's order dismissing 
Mrs. Harris' Petition was improper and must be reversed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT MRS. 
HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs. 
Harris Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As 
previously set forth in Mrs. Harrisfs Appeal Brief, Utah courts have 
consistently and repeatedly declared that in order for the doctrine of 
res judicata to apply the person asserting the doctrine must establish 
three elements. First, both actions must involve the same parties or 
their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must 
have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and 
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit 
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. State in 
Interest of J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994); Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985). Because Spivey was not a 
party to the divorce proceeding between Mrs. Harris and Glendon, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Mrs. Harris1 
Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
It is an undisputed fact that the divorce proceeding between Mrs. 
Harris and Glendon only involved Mrs. Harris and her former husband 
Glendon. Spivey was not a party to the divorce proceeding, and she 
was not in privity with Glendon in the divorce proceeding. As 
previously set forth in Mrs. Harris1 Appeal Brief, a privy is defined 
in Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), as follows: 
The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in interest 
with another that he represents the same legal right, this includes a mutual or successive 
relationship to rights in property. Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or decrees 
of court, privity means "one whose interest has been legally represented at the time." 
citing Tanner v. Bacon. 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (1943). 
Spivey asserts that she was in privity with Glendon because he 
assigned his rights to the retirement and 4OIK plans to her when he 
made her his beneficiary in 1990. (Spivey's Brief, page 18). As 
support for this ludicrous assertion, Spivey cites to Black1s Law 
Dictionary. While Black's Law Dictionary is a well-respected 
publication, it is hardly an authority to be cited in contravention of 
a published definition of privity by the Utah Supreme Court. Spivey's 
cite to Black's Law Dictionary is, however, another indication of the 
weakness of Spivey's argument and an indication of her desperation to 
find anything to attempt to dispute the clear and controlling law that 
supports Mrs. Harris' lawful right to a share of Glendon's retirement 
and pension benefits. 
Contrary to Spivey's assertion she was not in privity with 
Glendon with respect to his marriage with Mrs. Harris. Spivey 
stretches the boundaries of reason and logic in asserting to this 
Court that she was in privity with Glendon with respect to his divorce 
proceeding with Mrs. Harris. Spivey may have been in privity with 
Glendon with respect to some things subsequent to their marriage, but 
as a matter of law she was not in privity with him at the time of his 
marriage to Mrs. Harris. Spivey was also not in privity with Glendon 
with respect to his marriage to Mrs. Harris, she was not in privity 
with Glendon in his marriage to Mrs. Harris at the time of his divorce 
from Mrs. Harris, unless Spivey married Glendon prior to the time he 
was divorced from Mrs. Harris. Does Spivey now want to claim she was 
also married to Mrs. Harris and that she was also divorced from Mrs. 
Harris in the divorce proceeding between Mrs. Harris and Glendon? 
Because Spivey was not a party to the divorce action between Mrs. 
Harris and Glendon, and because she was not in privity with Glendon 
with respect to the marriage or the divorce proceeding between Mrs. 
Harris and Glendon, she is not legally entitled to assert the doctrine 
of res judicata as a defense to Mrs. Harris1 Petition. Because Spivey 
is not legally entitled to assert the doctrine of res judicata as a 
defense to Mrs. Harris1 Petition, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in dismissing Mrs. Harris1 Petition. 
Spivey's assertion that Mrs. Harris' Petition is barred by 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) and Ostler 
v. Ostler, 789 p.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) is simply not true. The 
factual situation of both Throckmorton. and Ostler, are 
distinguishable from this case. In neither Throckmorton nor Ostler 
did the parties seeking to modify the divorce decrees present 
uncontrovertible evidence that the other parties to the divorce 
proceedings had fraudulently misrepresented the nonexistence of 
martial property. Both of the parties seeking to modify the divorce 
decrees in Throckmorton and Ostler knew of the existence of their 
spouses' retirement and/or pension benefits. Mrs. Harris did not 
learn of Glendon's retirement and pension benefits until 1995 when her 
attorney discovered the existence of those benefits while conducting 
discovery in the probate case of Glendon's estate. 
Because of Glendon's fraudulent representations to the court 
during his divorce proceeding with Mrs. Harris, the doctrine of res 
judicata as applied in Throckmorton and Ostler does not apply in this 
case. Res judicata does not apply if one of the parties to the 
previous proceeding committed fraud. See 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments, 
§ 601 declaring: 
[T]he principles of res judicata may not be invoked to sustain fraud, and a judgment 
obtained by fraud or collusion may not be used as a basis of the application of the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
Because the doctrine of res judicata, as announced in 
Throckmorton, does not apply to Mrs. Harris' Petition, the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in granting Spivey's Motion to Dismiss. That 
error was prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, this Court must 
reverse the trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition and 
enter instructions to the trial court to modify the Divorce Decree 
between Mrs. Harris and Glendon and instruct the trial court to award 
Mrs. Harris her rightful and lawful share of all of Glendon's 
retirement benefits, including his pension benefits, 4OIK Plans and 
457 benefits. 
Spivey asserts that Carpenter v. Carpenter, 722 P.2d 230, 150 
Ariz. 52 (Ariz. 1986) as cited in Mrs. Harris' Appeal Brief does not 
support Mrs. Harris' assertion that this Court should adopt the better 
reasoned position that a divorce decree should be modifiable after the 
death of one of the parties to the divorce. Spivey claims that 
Carpenter only allowed modification of the divorce decree because 
Arizona is a community property state. While there is nothing in 
Carpenter to support that assertion, even if true, Carpenter still 
stands for the proposition that Mrs. Harris' divorce decree with 
Glendon should be modified. 
What Arizona calls community property, Utah simply calls marital 
property. If Arizona permits modification of a divorce decree after 
the death of one of the parties to properly distribute "community 
property11, then Utah should permit a divorce decree to be modified 
after the death of one of the parties to the action in order to 
properly distribute marital property. 
What Carpenter really stands for is the clear trend of the 
majority of courts throughout this country to recognize that divorce 
decrees should be permitted to be modified after the death of one of 
the parties to the divorce action. Carpenter stands for fundamental 
principals of fairness, equity and justice by permitting a court to 
modify a divorce decree, after the death of one of the parties to the 
divorce, in order to distribute marital property, avoid fraud and 
further the interests of justice. Carpenter clearly supports Mrs. 
Harris1 assertion that her divorce decree with Glendon should be 
modified and that she should receive her rightful share of Glendon's 
retirement and pension benefits, benefits of which she was wrongfully 
and fraudulently denied. 
Fraud upon the court justifies a court modifying a divorce so 
obtained. See St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982). 
Because Glendon's sworn statement, made in the divorce proceeding in 
the with Mrs. Harris, indicating that he had no pension or retirement 
benefits was fraudulent, Mrs. Harris is legally entitled to have the 
divorce with Glendon modified. 
POINT III 
WHETHER A DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE MODIFIED AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE 
OF THE PARTIES TO THE DECREE IS A QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION THAT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE. 
As previously stated in Mrs. Harris1 Appeal Brief, Mrs. Harris1 
counsel has not found any Utah case that addresses the issue of 
modification of a divorce decree after the death of one of the parties 
to the decree. And, as previously stated, the only real issue in this 
appeal is whether this Court will take the position that a divorce 
decree may be modified after the death of one of the parties to the 
decree. 
In her argument against Mrs. Harris1 assertion that this Court 
should adopt the majority, and better-reasoned position that a divorce 
decree may be modified after the death of one of the parties, Spivey, 
again, in direct contravention of Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, cites to Judge Schofield Memorandum Decision 
in this case as authority in her Brief. (Spivey1s Brief at pages 20-
21). Again, Spivey's citation to Judge Schofield's Memorandum 
Decision as authority for this appeal is not only totally devoid of 
any precedential value; it is a direct violation of Utah law and 
should be stricken. However, the portions of Judge Schofield's 
decision cited by Spivey are particularly enlightening, though not 
correct or controlling. 
Judge Schofield states in his Memorandum Decision that: 
A divorce decree settles the rights of the two divorcing parties. In this case Bonnie and 
Glendon were divorced in May 1980, some fifteen years before this modification proceeding 
was brought At that time their respective interests in marital assets were determined. Now 
Bonnie asks that this Court modify that aged divorce decree. Yet, one of the parties is not 
present, nor can he be present as he died three months before the filing of this action. His 
property rights were fixed when he died. If Bonnie had any claim against him, it would be a 
claim against his estate, not a claim to modify the divorce decree. Yet she is asking this 
Court to ignore the fact of his death and determine the rights which she and Glendon have 
concerning a retirement benefit which, accrued, if at all during a marriage which terminated 
fifteen years ago. (Emphasis added) . 
Judge Schofield citing Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 301 (Utah App. 
1992), which in turn cited to Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 597 (Utah 
1979), then goes on to declare: 
IfFarrell and Nelson have meaning, it is that as between divorcing parties, property rights 
are fixed and at the time of death and divorce cannot change or modify the effect of death 
in fixing property rights. If that is so in Farrell it is more so in this case as Bonnie brought 
this action well after Glendon9s death. Any property rights which she may have had in 
common with Glendon were fixed and would have need to be decided in the context of a 
probate of his estate, not by resort to a modification of the old divorce decree. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Judge Schofield's decision, while incorrect, is particularly 
interesting because Judge Boyd K. Park of the Fourth District Court, 
when asked by Spivey to in the probate proceeding to decide whether or 
not Glendon's retirement and pension benefits were part of Glendon's 
estate and whether or not division and distribution of Glendon1s 
pension and retirement could be made in the probate proceeding, ruled 
that Glendonfs pension and retirement benefits were not part of 
Glendonfs estate and that a determination and distribution of 
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits could not be made in the 
probate proceeding. A copy of Judge Park's Memorandum Decision is 
included in the Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
If Judge Schofield is right then Mrs. Harris is required to 
litigate her claims to her share of Glendon1s retirement and pension 
benefits in the probate case. However, if Judge Park is right Mrs. 
Harris cannot litigate her claims in the probate case because 
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits are not part of his estate. 
Therefore, Mrs. Harris must litigate her claims in another proceeding. 
Mrs. Harris cannot litigate her claims in the original divorce 
proceeding because the divorce court lost jurisdiction over the case 
upon the death of Glendon. Consequently, Mrs. Harris was required to 
file a new case, i.e., this case in order to litigate her lawful claim 
to a portion of Glendonfs retirement and pension benefits. If Mrs. 
Harris is not allowed to litigate her claim anywhere, then her due 
process rights under both the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution 
of Utah have been violated. Mrs. Harris must be afforded a forum 
where she is able to litigate her lawful claim to a portion of 
Glendon's pension and retirement benefits. 
Spivey admits under the prevailing authority, a divorce decree 
may be modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce 
when the surviving spouse has been wrongfully deprived of their right 
to a marital asset or marital property by the deceased spouse. 
(Spivey's Brief, page 21). Spivey, however, then asserts that Mrs. 
Harris is not entitled to modify her divorce decree with Glendon 
because there was no fraud. That assertion is a blatant lie. It is 
undisputable that during his divorce with Mrs. Harris, Glendon falsely 
represented that he had no retirement benefits. (Record at pages 24-
23 & 117-118). That representation was fraudulent. 
Spivey then asserts that because a "trial" was held that 
Glendon's false representations are somehow sanitized. Spivey 
advances the novel idea that fraud and misrepresentation in the 
context of a trial is acceptable, if the fraud and misrepresentation 
is not discovered. However, fraud and misrepresentation in a default 
setting is bad, but fraud is not bad if the person being defrauded is 
represented by counsel. But for some reason, Spivey cites no 
authority for that inane proposition. 
Spivey next cites this Court to Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 60 
P 465 (1902) as authority that a divorce decree cannot be modified 
after the death of one of the parties to the divorce. Karren is based 
on a former statute, i.e., Utah Revised Statutes, § 1212. Because 
Karren is based on old law and a non existent statute, it is of no 
precedential value in this case. 
Spivey has not, and cannot, cite this Court to any Utah case 
declaring that a petition to modify a divorce decree, in a case in 
which one party has died, must be filed in the divorce proceeding. 
There is no such case. 
POINT IV 
MRS. HARRIS PETITION TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE BETWEEN HER AND 
GLENDON IS PROPER. 
A petition to modify a divorce decree need only allege changed 
circumstances if the party seeking the modification is seeking to 
modify the decree with respect to some provision that was decided or 
addressed in the original decree. A divorce decree can be modified to 
include items that were omitted, incorrectly included or to correct 
mistakes in the decree. In such cases, an allegation of change in 
circumstances in not necessary. 
Because Mrs. Harris is only seeking to modify her divorce decree 
with Glendon with respect to the retirement and pension benefits of 
Glendon that were acquired during their marriage and because the 
distribution of those benefits was not addressed during the divorce 
between Mrs. Harris and Glendon, there was no need for Mrs. Harris to 
allege a change in circumstances in her Petition. Nonetheless, Mrs. 
Harris set forth facts in opposition to Spivey's Motion to Dismiss 
which clearly establishes a change in Mrs. Harris1 circumstances since 
her divorce from Glendon, facts which satisfy any requirements 
justifying a modification of her divorce decree with Glendon. 
Furthermore, Spivey never raised the issue of any defect in Mrs. 
Harris1 Petition in the trial court. Therefore, she is estopped to do 
so on appeal. 
Spivey's reference to state and federal rules and regulations 
concerning distribution of retirement or pension benefits and the 
designation of beneficiaries of retirement or pension benefits is 
totally irrelevant to any issue in this proceeding. 
Contrary to Spivey's assertion, Mrs. Harris is not seeking 
alimony or support. Mrs. Harris is not seeking to vacate the divorce 
decree between her and Glendon. Mrs. Harris is simply seeking to 
modify the divorce decree between her and Glendon in order to receive 
what rightfully and legally belongs to her, i.e., that portion of 
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits that she helped earn during 
her eighteen year marriage to Glendon. Retirement and pension 
benefits that under Utah law are marital property. Property rights of 
which she was unlawfully and improperly deprived because of Glendon's 
fraudulent representations to the divorce court. 
It is extremely hypocritical and disingenuous of Spivey to claim 
out of one side of her mouth that Mrs. Harris1 Petition is improper 
because Mrs. Harris did not specify the changes in her circumstances 
since her divorce from Glendon in her Petition. Yet, out of the other 
side of her mouth, claim that Mrs. Harris1 undisputed changes in her 
circumstances are irrelevant. Spivey demands that Mrs. Harris specify 
changes supporting her Petition, yet, asserts that any changes are 
irrelevant. 
Spivey's hypothetical examples do not give credence to her 
position. In both hypotheticals the spouse should and would be 
permitted to modify the divorce decree to obtain their lawful share of 
marital property which they failed to receive, and which the divorce 
courts failed to distribute, due to the fraud of the other spouse. 
Yes, Elizabeth Taylor would and should be permitted to modify a 
divorce decree that is 40 years old if her husband fraudulently 
represented the nonexistence of marital property, and Ms. Taylor was 
denied her lawful share of that marital property by the fraudulent 
representations of her spouse. 
Judge Schofield simply erred in concluding that Mrs. Harris is 
not entitled to modify the divorce decree between her and Glendon in 
order to obtain her rightful and lawful share of Glendon's pension and 
retirement benefits. Benefits that are indisputably marital property, 
benefits which Mrs. Harris was deprived of because of the fraudulent 
representations made by Glendon in the divorce proceeding. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in St. Pierre v. 
Edmonds, supra, that a divorce decree that is obtained through fraud 
may be challenged in an independent action. Id, at 619. Therefore, 
Mrs. Harris' Petition to modify the divorce decree between her and 
Glendon is proper, and contrary to Judge Schofield's decision, Mrs. 
Harris did not need to seek a modification of the divorce decree in 
the divorce case. 
The trial court clearly committed reversible and prejudicial 
error when it granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the 
trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition must be reversed 
and the trial court directed to modify the Divorce Decree between Mrs. 
Harris and Glendon, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and legal share 
of all of Glendon's retirement benefits, including his pension 
benefits, 401K Plans and 457 benefits. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT SPIVEY'S REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Harris' Petition was 
not a violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(hereinafter, "Rule 11"). Therefore, Spivey's Cross-Appeal requesting 
attorney's fees must be denied. 
In her attempt to convince this Court that there is a "vendetta" 
against her, Spivey makes references to alleged actions that allegedly 
transpired in the probate case of Glendon's estate. Those alleged 
facts, even if true, do not constitute a violation of Rule 11. The 
mere fact that Charles Schultz represents Mrs. Harris and also 
represents Don Spivey, Cynthia Sorensen and Lisa Spivey in the probate 
proceeding regarding Glendon's estate does not mean that a vendetta is 
taking place against Spivey. Nor, does the fact that Charles Schultz 
represents Don Spivey, Cynthia Sorensen and Lisa Spivey in the probate 
proceeding regarding Glendon's estate constitute a violation of Rule 
11 in this case. The two cases have nothing in common other than the 
fact that Mrs. Harris' counsel learned of Glendon's pension and 
retirement benefits and learned that Mrs. Harris did not receive her 
rightful and lawful share of those benefits in her divorce with 
Glendon while conducting research in the probate case. 
Mr. Schultz has also represented Mrs. Harris and Lisa Spivey in 
actions with Salt Lake City Corporation. Could there be a vendetta 
against Salt Lake City Corporation? Is Mr. Schultz's representation 
of Mrs. Harris and Ms. Spivey in the cases with Salt Lake City 
Corporation a violation of Rule 11? 
In pertinent part, Rule 11 states as follows: 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed 
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name who is duly licensed to practice in 
the state of Utah. . . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him 
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . . 
Even if this Court chooses to affirm Judge Schofield's decision 
and chooses to adopt the position that in Utah a divorce decree cannot 
be modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce, Mrs. 
Harris1 Petition is not a violation of Rule 11. Mrs. Harris1 counsel 
conducted extensive research in this case before filing Mrs. Harris1 
Petition, more so than any other case he has ever filed. There is an 
overwhelming amount of authority supporting the validity and 
appropriateness of Mrs. Harris1 Petition. See e.g., 24 Am Jur 2d, 
Divorce and Separation, § 487, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 
492, 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 601, and Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra. 
There is clear and undisputable authority to justify Mrs. Harris1 
argument for this Court adopting the position that a divorce decree 
can be modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce. 
It is undisputed that there is no case law on this issue in Utah by a 
Utah appellate court. Therefore, Mrs. Harris' argument is, even under 
worst case scenario, a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. Mrs. Harris1 Petition was 
not filed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
Spivey flatters herself. Spivey is just not important enough for Mrs. 
Harris to waste her time and money on a "vendetta11 against Spivey. 
The standard of review for an alleged Rule 11 violation is a 
clearly erroneous standard. See Barnard v. Sutliff, 946 P.2d 1229, 
1236 (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court further declared in Barnard 
v. Sutliff that an attorney need not reach the correct conclusion to 
avoid Rule 11 Sanctions. He only needs to make a reasonable inquiry. 
Lie 11 does not require a perfect search, only a search that is 
>jectively reasonable. Therefore, even if this Court agrees with 
idge Schofield's decision to dismiss Mrs. Harris's Petition, Mrs. 
irris' argument in support of her Petition and the research conducted 
rior to filing that Petition and the authorities cited by Mrs. Harris 
1 support of her Petition clearly and unequivocally establish that 
ider no set of circumstances was Mrs. Harris' Petition filed in 
Lolation of Rule 11. 
Though Judge Schofield erred in dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition, 
i correctly held that, even under the improper law he applied to this 
ase, Mrs. Harris' Petition was not a violation of Rule 11. That 
iling was correct. Therefore, Spivey's appeal of Judge Schofield's 
snial of Rule 11 sanctions must be denied and Judge Schofield's 
anial of Spivey's request for attorney's fees affirmed, irrespective 
f how this Court decides on the issue of modification of a divorce 
ecree after the death on of the parties to the divorce. 
X 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error when 
t granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the trial court's 
rder dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition must be reversed and the trial 
ourt directed to modify the Divorce Decree between Mrs. Harris and 
lendon, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and lawful share of all of 
lendon's retirement benefits, including his pension benefits, 401K 
lans and 457 benefits. 
WHEREFORE, Mrs. Harris respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the order entered by the trial court dismissing her Petition 
and enter instructions directing that she be awarded her rightful and 
legal share of the pension and retirement benefits of her former 
husband, Glendon G. Spivey, including his 4OIK plans and 457 plans. 
Dated this day of June 1996. 
Chaflfe^fe Schultz 
Attorney for Bonnie Kay Harris 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-508 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 487 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 492 
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 601 
Memorandum of Judge Boyd K. Park in case No. 943400572 PB 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98, Key Numbers. — Pleading ** 4, 13, 15, 
371 to 375, 418. 38 V2 to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
ANALY8IS 
Amendment of complaint. 
Appeals. 
Nature of duty imposed. 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
—Sanctions. 
—Standard. 
Cited. 
Amendment of complaint 
Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facts as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary. 
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 
(1954). 
Appeals* 
After voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs, the 
trial court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce 
sanctions under this rule did not legally preju-
dice plaintiffs and there was no final appeal-
able order. Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 
P.2d 1036 (Utah 1994). 
Nature of duty imposed. 
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public 
duty as an* officer of the court, as opposed to the 
attorney's private duty to represent a client's 
interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 
1146 (Utah 1991). 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Certification by an attorney "that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after a reasonable inquiry the com-
plaint is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law" does not require him to 
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion be-
fore filing a medical malpractice action. 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 vUiah Ct 
App. 1989). 
Under this ruL- «i party need not have 
reached the correct conciu^ n he need only 
973 OPERATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-510 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from 
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the 
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting forth the facts of the 
deposit and a list of all known claimants, including known addresses. The 
clerk shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of receiving the affidavit 
of deposit. 
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to 
these funds and request a hearing before the court. The petitioner requesting 
the hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the 
trustee's affidavit of deposit and any others known to the petitioner. All per-
sons having or claiming an interest must appear and assert their claim or be 
barred thereafter. 
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the court will establish the 
priorities of the parties to the trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with 
the clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the disbursement of funds 
as determined. 
Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions. 
Applicability: 
This rule Bhall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value 
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of 
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 
[Added effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-509. [Reserved.] 
Rule 4-510. Alternative dispute resolution. 
Intent: 
To establish a program of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution for 
ivil cases in the District Courts. 
Applicability: 
These rules shall apply to cases filed in the District Court in the Third and 
?ifth Judicial Districts. The rules do not apply to actions brought under Chap-
ters 3a and 6 of Title 78, Chapter 6 of Title 30, Chapter 12 of Title 62A, 
Chapter 20a of Title 77, Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to 
incontested matters brought under Chapter 1 of Title 42, Title 75, and Chap-
ers 22a, 30 and 41 of Title 78. 
statement of the Rule: 
(1) Definitions. 
(A) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution and includes arbitra-
tion, mediation, and other means of dispute resolution, other than court 
trial, authorized by this rule and URCADR; 
(B) "ADR program" means the alternative dispute resolution program 
described in by Chapter 31b, Title 7g; 
(C) "Binding arbitration" means an ADR proceeding in which the 
award is final and enforceable as any other judgment in a civil action 
21 \ m j u r 2d DIVORCE AND SEPARATION §487 
jurisdiction,37 or which «*» void on its face,38 may be vacated at am tim<\ \n the 
absence of laches or estoppel.3* A statute which prescribes a time vvithin which 
one must file a petition to vacate on the ground of mistake, in.id\enence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect, does not affec the time wirhm which the court 
may exercise its inherent power to vacate on the ground ol fraud40 or !.ick of 
jurisdiction.41 
The power of a court of equity to set aside a judgment of divorce procured 
by fraud is not restricted by a statute allowing a new trial to be granted w..hin 
one year after entry of a fraudulent judgment, where the fraud remained 
undiscovered for that time and could not have been discovered within it by 
any reasonable diligence.4* 
§487. Laches. 
Generally, in divorce case^, whoever wishes to have a judgment set aside on 
the ground that it was obtained by fraud, duress, accident, mistake, or surprise 
must act diligently in seeking relief.43 Independent of statute, delay in institut-
ing the proceeding may constitute such laches as will deprive the applicant of 
the rigjit to have the judgment or decree in a divorce case vacated,44 In a 
proper case laches is a defense even if the complainant asserted his grounds 
for vacating the judgment within the statutory time.4* Even though the decree 
is void for want o£ good service of process, laclies may prevent the vacation of 
the decree.46 
The mere lapse of time doc* not constitute laches within the foregoing 
rules; it must appear that the delay has caused injury.47 Instances of prejudice 
ability of insanity, drain removes the disability, 
and thereupon the time for instituting the 
proceedings begins to run. Wood v Wood, 130 
Iowa 128, 113 NW 492. 
37. Chisholm v Chisholm, 98 Fla 1196, 125 
So 694; Baker v Baker, 221 Ga 332, 144 St 2d 
*29; Williamson v Williamson. (Iowa) U>\ NW 
482; Huffman v Huffman. 47 Or 610, 86 P 593. 
Annotation: 6 ALR2d 638, § 11; 22 ALK2d 
1325. § 10. 
38. Fraunhofer v Price. 182 Mont 7, 594 P2d 
324; Shaver v Shaver, 248 NC 113. 103 St2d 
791. 
In Alabama the view has been taken that a 
divorce decree which is void on the face of rhe 
record for want of jurisdiction may be vacated 
at anv ^me, but thai "if the decree is not void 
or* ••><? face of the record it cannot be vacated 
on a motion made more than 30 days after ic 
was rendered. Aiello v Aietlo, 272 Ala 505, 133 
So 2d 18. 
*9. As to laches and estoppel, sec §§487, 
4«'Sfc, infra. 
40. McGuinness v Superior Court of San 
Francisco. 196 Cal 222, 237 P 42, 40 ALR 
11!0. 
41. Swift v Swift, 239 Iowa 62, 29 NW2d 535. 
42. Wood v Wood. 136 Iowa 128, 113 NW 
492. 
43. Pryor v Pryor, 240 Md 224, 213 A2d 545; 
Cook v Cool. 167 Or 480, 118 Wd 1070; 
Grant v Grant. 233 SC 433. 105 SE2d 523. 
Annotation: 12 ALR 2d 163. f 5. 
44. Horton v Stegnuer (CA8 Colo) 175 F 
756; Multer v Mulier, 280 Ala 458, 195 So 2d 
105; Re Marriage of Wipson (2d Dist) 113 Cai 
App 3d 136, 169 Cal Rptr 664 (delav of more 
than three vears in seeking relief from dissolu-
tion of marriage judgment); McElrath v McKl-
»ath, 120 Minn 380. 139 NW 708; Crann v 
Cratin. 178 Miss 896. 174 So 255. Watkinson v 
Watkinson, <<8 NJ Kq 632. 60 A 931. B.duell v 
B.dwell. 139 NC 402, 52 S£ 55. Hantord v 
Hartford. 53 Ohio App 2d 79, 7 Ohio Ops 3d 
53. 371 NK2d 391; Grant \ Grant. 233 SC 433. 
105 SF*2d 523; Karren v Karren. 25 Utah H7. 
69 P 4 J O . 
Annotation: 12 Al.R2d 163. §6. 
As to the vfi-f of laches on the pan of the 
petitioner after rcmauugo <>! the spouse obi-
taining the divorce, see § 492, inira. 
Practice Aids.—Answer alleging laches bv 
plaintiff in asserting grounds for vacating di-
vorce decree. 8A AM JUR PL 1 PK FORMS (Rev), 
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, Form 789. 
45. Van De Rvt v Van De Rvt. 6 Ohio St 2d 
31. 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 Nfc.2d o98. 16 
ALR3d 271. 
46. Swift v Swift. 239 Iowa 62, 29 NW2d 535. 
47. Leathers v Stewart, 108 Me 96, 79 A 16; 
Meyer v Meyer, 326 Mast 491. 95 NE2d 645. 
Annotation: 6 ALR2d 639. I 11; 12 ALR2d 
163. §5. 
£ 1 7 
§ 487 DIVORCE AND SEP \RATIOX 24 Am Jur 2d 
resuming from delay are the cases in which the pre\aihng partv, after a 
reasonable delav, married an innocent third pan\ ** Another instance of 
prejudice is the case where the person who obtained the dixone died a few 
vears after obtaining it, for then the question as to the right to the di\oue 
cannot be tried again and the te^'imom of 'he plaintiff cannot be made 
available.4* 
The delay which is significant is that which has occurred with knowledge or 
notice of the facts giving the right to relief If, theiefore, the defendant was 
not given adequate notice of the pendencv of the action, and he sought relief 
with reasonable promptness after discovering the facts, he is not guilt) of 
laches.50 
§488. Estoppel. 
One seeking relief from a divorce decree may be estopped from attacking 
it.51 The estoppel may arise from conduct after the entrv of the decree. Thus, 
one cannot be relieved from a judgment of divorce after using the privileges 
which it confers; in other words, one cannot accept benefits of a decree and 
not be bound by its burdens." The wife's acceptance of alimony allowed in a 
dworce decree granted tot the husband is an element which, in combination 
with other elements, may estop the wife from having the decree set aside, 
despite the existence of good grounds for annulling it w Likewise, the wife's 
acceptance of money and property in lieu of ahmonv and as a propertv 
settlement, and her use of the money a^d propertv for her own benefit for 
several years, may estop her from having the u^ "ne set aside.54 If the wife, 
after the husband obtains a decree of divorce, brings action against him as an 
unmarried woman to recover certain persom! propertv in his possession 
belonging to her, she is estopped from afterward questioning the validity of 
the divorce.65 
Generally, if one against whom a divorce decree has been granted remarries, 
he or she is thereafter estopped to assail the validity of the divorce,* although 
48. 4 492, infra 
49. Horton v Stegmver (CA8 Colo) 175 F 
756, C a m Admr Car. 9? Ky 5V2, 18 SW 
4 53, VfcElrath v \kEIraih, 120 Minn 380 M9 
NW 708 
50. Lindley v Lindlcv. 274 AU 570, 150 So 2d 
746 
Annotation; 12 ALR2d 166. § 7. 
51. Reichcrt v Appel (Fla) 74 So 2d 674, 
Weihenngton v Wethenngton, 216 Ga 325, 
116\SE2d 234; Attebery v Atteben. 172 \ e b 
671, 111 NW2d 553, Karren v Karrt* 25 Utah 
87. 69 P 465 
As to the necessity for pleading estoppel in a 
proceeding to vacate a divorce decree, see 
§ 496, infra 
52. Tennessee v Barton, 210 Ark 816, 198 
SV\2d 512, Cratin v Cratin, 178 Miss *Q6, '74 
So 255, Attebery v Attebery, 172 Neb 671, 111 
NW2d 553 
A divorce judgment would not be set aside 
by bill of review v%here the complainant, who 
was under no financial compulsion to do so, 
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the judg-
ment and continued to accept those >enefus 
alter hec former husband's alleged fraud was 
discovered and after a bill of revieu Has hied, 
and uhere the rights of ihe former husband 
would be prejudiced if the judgment *as set 
aside Biggs v Biggs (Tex Ci\ App Nth Dist) 
553 SV\2d 207, wnt dism w o j . 
53. Mohler v Shank's Estate 93 lowt 271. 61 
NW 981 B.d»ell v Bid*eil. 139 NC 102. 52 SK 
55 
54. McDonald v \eale, 35 III App 2d 140 IS2 
\L2d 366. cert den 372 LS 911, 9 L rd 2d 
719.83 SCt 725 
55. BaiK v Bailv, 44 Fa 274 
56. Arthur v Israel. 15 Colo 147, 25 P 81. 
later app 18 Colo 158. 32 P 68, error dismd 
\j> I S 355 38 L Ed 474, 14 S Ci 5*3 
Reichert v Appel (Fla) 74 So 2d 674. Davis v 
Daws. 191 Ga 333, 11 SE2d 884. Coombcs v 
Coombes, 91 Idaho 729. 430 P2d 95, Re 
Marriage of Gnka. 90 III App 3d 443 45 III 
Dec 820, 413 \E2d 153. Justus v Justus 208 
Kan 879, 495 P2d 98. Rouse v Rouse. 219 La 
1065 55 So 2d 246, Jo\ v Miles, 190 Misi 255 
199 So 771, Atteberv \ Aucberv, 172 Neb 671 
111 \VV2d 553, Hanks v Hanks (SD) 296 
NW2d 523 later app (SD) 334 \W2d 856 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 169, f 8. 
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vvi" take into consideration the public pohev to prevent the basiardi/mg of 
children of the second marriage and also the resulting injury to the innocent 
partv to the second mamage.*2 Nevertheless, the mere lapse of tune does not 
constitute laches; the delay must have caused injurv. and if the second 
marriage occurred soon after the divorce and at a time when the other partv 
to the decree could not have been expected to seek relief, as \*here the 
divorce was procured bv fraud and the innocent partv could not reasonably 
have learned of the fraud m time to prevent the second marriage bv bringing 
a proceeding to set aside the decree, the delay does not cause sufficient injury 
to warrant the application of the doctrine of laches.M A delay of several 
months or vears after learning of the entrv of a divorce decree before seeking 
to have it set aside has been held not to constitute laches as a matter of law, 
where the remarriage occurred before the first wife learned of the decree, so 
that the delav in seeking relief after discovering the facts was not the cause of 
the second wife's unfortunate situation.*4 Clearly, where a proceeding to vacate 
a decree has been instituted belore the second marriage occurs, the second 
marriage is not entitled to consideration when determining whether to grant 
the motion or petition to vacate.9* 
§ 493. Death of party. 
The general nile is that an application to vacate a decree of divorce does 
not lie after the death of a party, where property rights arc not involved, since 
death itself severs a marital relation and the onlv object to be accomplished by 
the vacation of the decree would be sentimental >r illusory.* Some courts 
have recognized an exception to this rule where the decree v>ds obtained bv 
fraud, the theory being that in such a case the court must be resolute to 
preserve its integrity against imposition and that the party against v>hom the 
divorce 'vas rendered should have opportunity to disprove his guilt of the 
82. Bussey v Bussev, 95 NH 349, 64 A2d 4, 
12 ALR2d 151. Hvatt v Hvati (1st Dept) 57 
A D Div 2d 809, 395 NYS2d 2, Grant v GraYit, 
2J3 SC 433, 105 SK2d 523. Karren v Karren, 
. 5 Utah 87, 69 P 465 
Annotation: !7ALR4th 1153 
83. Leathers v Stewart, 108 Me 96. 79 A 16. 
Connelly v Connellv. 190 Md 79. 57 A2d 276. 
Hd>! v Hall, 70 Mont 460, 22b P 469 
Annotation: 12 ALR2d 163, § 5 
The remarriage and subsequent death of the 
plaintiff husband in a divorce suit, prior to the 
nlmg by the divorced wife of a petition to 
strike out the divorce decree, do n< i preclude 
the first wife from attacking the divorce decree 
as a fraud upon the court but are factors m 
considering the application of lathes and the 
necessary prejudice - resulting from the first 
wife's unwarranted dtlav1 of 13 years in filing 
the petition Pnor v Prvor, 240 Md 224, 213 
\2d ri45 
1 he prevailing husband who remarried 
within one week after entry ol the divorce 
d t a e c was not prejudiced bv his former wife s 
six months' dela\ in filing a motion to varue 
'he decree Vin De Rvt v Van De Rvt 6 Ohio 
M 2d 31, 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 \fc2d f><>8, 
]•> \LR3d 271 
84. Brandt v Brandt. 76 Aril 154. 261 P2d 
978, Connellv v Connelly, 190 Md 79. 57 A2d 
276, Hall v Hall, 70 Mont 460. 226 P 469. 
In a divorced life's bill of review action to 
set aside the divorce judgment and alterna-
tivelv the propertv division portion thereof, the 
defendant s remarriage, creation of a new com-
munity estate, and disposal of some assets 
received in the divorce judgment, did noi as a 
mailer of 'aw entitle the defendant to a sum-
mars judgment, where there was no showmg 
rhut whatever prejudice defendant might have 
exuenenced could not be remedied on retnal 
of the case DeCluitt v DeCIuitt 'Tex Civ \pp 
10th Dist) 613 SV\2d 777. writ UIMH W o j 
85. \\oma<k v Woman 7^ Ark 2S1 83 SV\ 
957 motion »«> modit« o r u t e ^n 73 Ark 2'K), 
o. VW » 136 
Annotation. ' » 4LR2d 162, J 4 
86. Dawson v Mavs. 159 Ark 331. 252 SVV 33. 
30 ALR 1403 Lawrence v Nelson 113 Iowa 
277 85 \ W 84. Scheihine v Baltimore & O R 
R , 180 Md 168, 23 A2d 381 Bussev Bussev. 
94 NH 328, 52 A2d 856. Towns v Towns (Tex 
C iv \pp 7th Dist) 290 SW2d 292, writ d.sm 
w o j 
Annotation: 6 ALR2d 645. § 13, 22 ALR2d 
1323 $8 
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the fraud was extrinsic, that is, \* deprived the opposing party of the opportunity 
to appear and present his ca^e m 
With respect to extrinsic f-aud, the doctrine of res judicata will not shield a 
blameworthv defendant from the consequences of his own misconduct * 
AccordingK the principles ol res judicata mav not be invoked to sustain fraud w 
and a judgment obtained bv fraud or collusion mav not be used as a basis lor 
the application of the doctrine of res judicata ** This is true also of the doctrine 
investing a judgment with conclusiveness as against a third person who is liable 
over to the judgment debtor with respect fo the cause of action adjudicated • 
In accordance with the above principles, where the omission of an item from 
a single cause of action is caused by the fraud or deception of the opposing 
party, the judgment in the first action does not bar a subsequent action for the 
omitted item ' There are some cases, however, in which the second action is 
95. Eichman v Fotomat Corp (4th Dist) 147 
Cal App 3d 1170. 197 Cal Rptr 612 later 
proceeding (CA9 Cal) 759 F2d 1434, 1985-1 
CCH Trade Cases 1 66606, later proceeding 
(CA9 Cal) 871 R d 784, 1989-1 CCH Trade 
Cases 1 68485 reported at (CA9 Cal) 880 F2d 
149 Cramer v Metropolitan Sav Asso , 136 
Mich App 387 357 NW2d 51 
A former wife s suit on a promissory note 
was barred by m judicata where the wife had, 
in the prior divorce proceeding, dismissed with 
prejudice her counterclaim based on the note, 
where the wife s claim that fraud had been 
perpetrated on the dissolution court by the 
husband by reason of his perjured testimony 
wherein he denied execution of the note did 
not qualify as fraud on the court, and where the 
wife knew that her husband denied e\» < uuon of 
the note in the dissolution action and could 
h ive litigaied the genuineness of his signature 
and the enforceability of the note in the prior 
action Trout \ Truitt (Fla App D5) 383 So 2d 
276 (criticized on oiher grounds as stated in 
OeClaire v \ohanan (Fla) 453 So 2d 375) 
96 Riehle v Manrolies 279 US 218 73 L Ed 
b69 49 S Ct 310 In re Bloomer (BC WD Mich) 
32 BR 2 J McCarn s F rst of Georgia Ins Co 
(CA10 Okla) 713 F2d 609 Fleming v Cooper 
225 Ark 634 284 *\\2d 857 58 Al R2d 694 
Ldmonds v Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist 217 
Cal 436, 19 P2d 502 Lpstein v Chatham Park 
Inc (Super) 52 Del 5o 153 A2d 180 Kern v 
Sutker (Fla) 40 So id 145 James W Glover 
Lf « v rong 42 Hawaii 560 Butler v But'er 
25J Iowa 1084 114 \ W 2 d 595 Carroll v 
fullenon 215 Kv - ^ 286 SW 847 (ovrld on 
other grounds in p*rt bv Ward v Southern Bell 
Tel 8c Tel Co k% 43b SW2d 794) Oanchette 
vVerner 155 Me "4 151 \2d 502 Chnstopher 
v Sisk 133 Md 4* M \ 355 Skinner % I own 
ship Board for \rfcentine Tp 238 Mich ^ 3 
2 1 3 \W 680 In re Shea s ,V\ ill 509 NY 605 
1 \ * 2 d 864 Sha- * Eaves 262 NC 656 I 58 
SL2d 520 Heaslev c nnz (ND) 142 \V\ 2d 60b 
Norwood v McDonald, 142 Ohio St 299, 27 
Ohio Ops 240, 52 NE2d 67, Howard v Huron, 
5 SD 539, 59 NW 833, reh den 6 SD 180. 60 
NW 803, Haudenschilt v Haudenschdt, 129 W 
Va 92, 39 SE2d 328 
97. Halloran v Blue & White Liberty Cab Co , 
253 Minn 436, 92 NW2d 794, New York Life 
Ins Co v Nashville Trust Co 200 Tenn 513, 
292 SW2d 749, 59 ALR2d 1086 Haudenschdi 
v Haudenschilt. 129 W Va 92, 39 S£2d 328 
98. New Orleans v Gaines s Adm r. 138 US 
595 34 L Ld 1102, 11 S Ct 428 Weil v Defen-
bach, 3b Idaho 37 208 P 1025 Ball v Reese. 58 
Kan o M 50 P 875, King v Emmons. 283 Mich 
116, 277 NW cT ' 115 ALR 564 Halloran v 
Blue & White Liberty Cab Co . 253 Minn 436, 
<>2 NW2d 794, Nichols v Stevens, 123 Mo 96, 
25 SW 578 27 SW 613, affd 157 US 370. 39 L 
Ed 736, 15 S Ct 640, Robertson Lumber Co v 
Progressive Contractors (ND) 160 NW2d 61 
cert den and app dismd 394 US 714 J L cd 
2d 671 89 S Ct 1451 Robinson v Phegiev S4 
Or 124 163 P 1166 Seubert v Scubert 68 SD 
195 299 NW 873 ater proceeding 69 SD 143 
7 NW2d 301 Ne* Nork Life Ins Co v Nashvii'e 
Trust Co 200 Tenn 513, 292 SW2d 749 59 
\LR2d 1086 Butcherv J I Case Ihreshing 
Mach Co (Tex Civ App> 207 SW 980 Hau 
denschilt v Haudenschilt 129 W Va 92 39 SL2d 
32S 
99 Pezel v Yerex 56 Cal \pp 304 205 » 475 
Kim Poo Kum v Sugivama 33 Hawaii J 4 5 (#er 
ber v Kansas Citv 311 Mo 49 277 SW 562 
Hartford Acci 8c Indem Co v hirst \\i 1 II ink 
3c Trust Co 281 NY 162 22 NFJd *2l 12J 
\LR 1149 
1 United States Rubber Co v Lucks \ int 
Inc (Ma App D3) 159 So 2d 874 Johnson v 
Provincial In* Co 12 Mich 216 Cauher Corp 
v Skinner 241 NC 532 85 SL2d 909 Hvvti v 
Smith 67 ND 425 272 NW 747 (ovrld on other 
grounds in pan by Hopkins v McBant (ND) 427 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GLENDON G. SPIVEY, 
Deceased. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
CASE NO. 943400572 
DATE: January 24, 1996 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
This matter came before the Coun on Petitioner Theresa G. Spivey's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, which were submitted for decision on 
December 5, 1995. 
Counsel for Theresa Spivey filed a request for oral arguments on November 8, 1995. 
Opposing counsel did not file a request. Because counsel could add nothing which would 
affect the Court's decision on this matter, the request for oral arguments is denied. 
The Court, having read the motions, accompanying memorandum in support and in 
opposition, affidavits, and having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises 
now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. On September 18, 1995, Theresa Spivey filed her "Verified Petition for Exempt 
Property, and Omitted Spouse's Share of Decedent's Property." In this petition, Theresa 
Spivey prays for the payment of a 55,000 exempt property as surviving wife and for a coun 
order granting her an omitted spouse's share under §75-2-301. 
2. Theresa Spivey filed her "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" on November 1, 
1995. In her motion, she asks die Court to rule that the retirement interests and 401K plan 
proceeds and the family home are not assets of the estate. Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 1-2. 
3. Along with the memorandum in support of the motion, she filed the affidavit of Dr. 
Brian P. Tudor, who treated decedent for his brain tumor. Dr. Tudor recites a brief medical 
history of the decedent and states his opinion that the decedent was "totally competent" from 
1990 through 1992. Affidavit of Brian P. Tudor 16. 
4. Lisa Spivey, Don Spivey, Cynthia K. Sorensen, and Bonnie K. Harris (hereinafter 
Lisa Spivey) filed a memorandum in opposition on November 13, 1995. In this 
memorandum, they argue that the decedent was incompetent when he executed the deed and 
retirement documents upon which Theresa Spivey relies. Attached to this memorandum were 
the affidavits of George Morse, John Wilkinson, Dale Childs, Stephen Hedger, Maggie 
Hedger, Carolyn McDougail, Gary Thomas Spivey, Cynthia K. Sorensen, and Bonnie 
Harris. The affiants were co-workers or otherwise acquaintances of the decedent and offer 
various opinions as to his competence and some specific instances to demonstrate 
incompetence, such as an inability to read and comprehend after he suffered his first seizure. 
5. On November 21, 1995, Theresa Spivey filed a motion to strike the affidavits of the 
above persons. In arguing her motion to strike, Mrs. Spivey argues that the affidavits are 
merely conclusory in form, based on information and belief and so must be rejected under 
Rule 56(e), that the affidavits contain hearsay, and that the affiants a$e incompetent to testify 
since none of them indicate they had any knowledge of the decedent executing deed or 
retirement documents. See Theresa Spivey's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion to 
Strike Affidavits of: George Morse, John Wilkinson, Dale Childs, Stephen Hedger, Maggie 
Hedger, Carolyn McDougail, Gary Thomas Spivey, Cynthia K. Sorensen, Bonnie Harris. 
6. The Court will first address the motion to strike and then move on to the motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
7. One of the reasons that Theresa Spivey gives to strike the affidavits is that the affiants 
do not have any knowledge of the decedent executing the documents in question. However, 
the affidavits were offered to show incompetence on the part of the decedent at the time he 
executed the documents. An affiant does not need to know of a persons act in executing a 
document in order to testify to the mental condition of the person during that time. Each of 
the affiants were acquainted with decedent during or immediately prior to the time the 
documents were executed. As such, they do have personal knowledge of his actions, 
demeanor and nature and are able to testify as to their observations at the time-this goes to 
the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility. 
8. Theresa Spivey also argues that the affidavits merely contain conclusory statements 
and hearsay and as they are based on information and belief, should be rejected under Rule 
56(e). The Court notes that the affidavits do contain some specific instances and 
observations of the affiants which could cause one to question the competence of the 
decedent. However, they are primarily statements of the opinions of the affiants as to the 
competence of the decedent. The question then is whether these lay opinions of mental 
competence are proper evidence. 
9. The courts of Utah have allowed lay witness opinion testimony on competency and 
mental condition. In First Interstate Bank, et. al. v. David O. Kesler, et. al., 702 P. 2d 86 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission UL by witness 
opinion that the testator was incompetent even though they had little contact with her in the 
last few years of her life and about one year prior to the execution of the will. It should also 
be noted that the testimony in Kesler was admitted in opposition to the testimony of two 
psychiatrists who interviewed the testator on the day she signed the will and pronounced her 
competent. In a liable action, the Court of Appeals allowed lay witnesses to testify on the 
mental condition of the plaintiff to show the truth of statements that he was "mentally 
deranged" and a "paranoid schizophrenic." Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1994). 
10. So long as the lay opinions meet the requirements of Rule 701, they are proper both 
at trial and in affidavits. That the witness may not be an expert or fault may be found with 
their observations goes to the weight to be given the evidence by the fact finder, not its 
admissibility. 
11. The Court finds that the affiant's testimony, subject to appropriate foundation, may be 
competent as to the mental condition of the decedent during the time they were acquainted 
with him. 
12. The Court denies Theresa Spivey's Motion to Strike. 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Family Home 
13. The first item upon which Theresa Spivey's asks for summary judgment is that the 
family home is not a part of the estate of decedent. Lisa Spivey argue* :Nu at the time the 
home was deeded by decedent to himself and Theresa Spivey in joint tenancy, he was 
incompetent to deed the property, relying on the affidavits discussed above. 
14. The affidavits provided by Lisa Spivey show there are genuine issues of material fact 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
15. The Court denies Theresa Spivey's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the 
family home. The Court will squire an evidentiary hearing to address the issue of the 
decedent's competence at the time he executed the deed. 
Decedent's Retirement Interests and 401K Plan Proceeds 
16. The second item which is the subject of Theresa Spivey's motion is the decedent's 
retirement interests and 40IK plan proceeds (hereinafter benefits). She argues that if the 
proceeds did not pass to her by the documents decedent signed prior to his death, they pass 
to her by operation of law, citing Utah Code Annotated §49-1-606(1). 
17. Lisa Spivey offers three arguments why summary judgment should not be given on 
the benefits. The first is that the decedent was incompetent to change his beneficiaries at the 
time he executed the documents designating Theresa Spivey. Whether decedent was 
competent or not does not affect whether the benefits passed to his spouse by operation of 
law. 
18. She also argues that "the Deceased's 40IK plan and benefits are voluntary 
participation plans that are only made available through the State Retirement System" and 
therefore §49-1-606(1) does not apply. Memorandum in Opposition to Theresa Gutirrez [sic] 
Spivey's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 8. However, she does not cite any 
statutory authority or case law for this position, nor does she offer any evidence that they are 
somehow different from other plans offered by the State Retirement System other than this 
single assertion. 
19. The documents which the decedent used to designate Theresa Spivey as beneficiary 
bear no indication that the plans were somehow different or separate from the Utah 
Retirement System or that they were subject to rules other than those found in the Utah State 
Retirement Act. Neither has the Court been able to find suppoit for different treatment in 
the Act or other statutes. 
20. The final argument is that the benefits are the subject of an appeal in another case. 
The other case deals with whether the decedent's former wife may claim some of the 
benefits. Apart from the same benefits being the subject matter of the cases, the appeal and 
this case do not share the same issues. The Court's determination that the benefits are not a 
part of the estate will not be affected should the appeal result in the former wife having an 
interest in the benefits. Accordingly, the Court sees no impediment to a grant of summary 
judgment that the benefits are not a part of decedent's estate. 
21. The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that preclude 
judgment as a matter of law that the retirement interests and 40IK plan proceeds are not a 
part of decedent's estate. 
22. Summary judgment is granted as to the retirement interests and 401K plan proceeds. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 24 day of January, 1996. 
BY^ffiE COURT: 
£ 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Charls A. Schultz 
Vemon L. Snow 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
